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THE FEDERAL REGIONAL FISHERY
MANAGEMENT COUNCILS:
A NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING APPROACH TO
FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Shepherd R. Grimes"
I. INODUCTION
The administrative structure of federal fisheries management in the
United States has evolved to directly represent the interests of user groups
that now exert tremendous influence over the management process.
Frequently, the involvement of such groups has prevented the effective
regulation of federal fisheries. As with many areas of regulatory control,
the federal regulating entity for marine fisheries has always had to deal
with at least two competing user groups whose interests are more often than
not at odds. Like other regulatory entities, the federal administrative
process has gone to considerable lengths to involve user groups in the
decisionmaking process. However, such involvement has resulted in
management that has not been resource minded, for example, management
that is best for the continued health of the resource, or management that this
article will equate with being in the public interest. Given the difficulty
involved with managing vast fishery resources, success in achieving what
is best for the resource would be more readily accomplished without user
groups exerting excessive control over the decisionmaking process.
This Comment discusses the potential for change in the administrative
rulemaking process for federal fisheries management, particularly the
regional council approach. After a brief background discussion to high-
light concern over the council structure, it begins with a general discussion
of negotiated rulemaking and its role in administrative government,
including some popular criticisms of the concept. Next, this Comment
briefly outlines the authority delegated to the Regional Fishery Manage-
ment Councils [hereinafter Councils] and the structure established by
federal law, detailing the required representation of regulated interests as
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voting members of the Councils in attempt to demonstrate their similarity
to negotiated rule-making committees. It then turns to a more pragmatic
discussion of how the evaluation and criticism of negotiated rulemaking
applies to the Councils. This Comment concludes with an evaluation of
how such criticisms might lead to improvements in the enabling legislation
and consequently the rulemaking process for federal fisheries management.
Specifically, how restructuring the Councils to preclude voting membership
for user group representatives would provide more effective "resource
minded" management.
IX. BACKGROUND
Beginning in the 1950s in the Atlantic and the 1960s in the Pacific,
foreign fishing pressure began to increase rapidly as other countries began
to exploit the largely untapped fishery resources off U.S. coastlines.' As
a result, Congress passed the Fishery Conservation and Management Act2
(Act) in 1976 to establish federal fisheries management of all fishery
resources located beyond state jurisdiction,3 but within the U.S. exclusive
economic zone extending 200 miles from all U.S. coastlines. The Act has
been said to reflect considerable interplay between disparate interests and
was eventually passed as an instrument arrived at by compromise between
groups.4 Since its passage there has been considerable doubt regarding the
effectiveness of the regulatory scheme it created, or at least regarding the
quality of regulation spawned by the legislation. Its most recent reauthori-
zation, the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act5 (SFA), included numerous
substantive amendments that many hailed as a victory for conservation and
ecosystem preservation.' The new provisions added by the SFA covered
both policy and scientific considerations, including a new requirement to
ensure that membership on regional councils is fair and balanced.7
1. See generally DANIELA. WALDECK& EUGENE H. BUCK, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE DRAFT REPORT, THE MAGNUSON-STEVENS FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGE-
MENT ACT: REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES FOR THE 106TH CONGRESS 4 (May 31, 1999).
2. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1976 & Supp. IV 1998). Now known as the Magnuson
Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, referred to hereinafter as the MSFCMA
or the Act.
3. See id
4. See Shi-Ling Hsu & James E. Wilen, Ecosystem Management and the 1996 Sustain-
able Fisheries Act, 24 EcooGy L.Q. 799, 800 (1997).
5. See Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
6. See Hsu & Wilen, supra note 4, at 799.
7. See WALDECK & BUCK, supra note 1, at 6. Other new provisions provided for require-
ments to: 1) conserve fish stocks and restore overfished populations; 2) impose a moratorium
on the creation of new individual fishing quota programs; 3) increase emphasis on social
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As reauthorization again looms on the horizon, the Congressional
Research Service queried a number of groups historically involved with
fisheries management issues in an attempt to determine what potential
issues concerned them regarding the impending reauthorization.' Those
contacted included commercial harvesters, recreational fishermen, fishery
managers, fishery scientists, fish processors, fishery unions, and environ-
mental organizations.' In response to the inquiry, contacted individuals
indicated they wanted the Act to ensure that regional council decisions are
fair and balanced." The changes made in the 1996 amendments and issues
currently concerning interested groups, at least in recent years, reflect a
continuing concern over the regional councils. Specifically of concern is
how to ensure that their decisions are fair and balanced, or similarly that
their membership is fair and balanced.
Il. NEGOTIATED RULEMAKING
Recommendations prepared for the Administrative Conference of the
United States"1 (ACUS) regarding procedures. for negotiating proposed
regulations are cited as providing the first real description of a negotiated
rulemaking process. 2 In more recent years it has been said that negotiated
benefits that might better preserve traditional small fishermen; and 4) strengthen provisions
to minimize bycatch and restore and protect habitat. See id The prohibition on the use of
individual transferable quota systems until the year 2000 was unfortunate. These quotas,
while apolitically controversial management tool, are thought by many to provide a solution
to many of the nation's fishery management ills. However, since Congress chose to prevent
further use of such quotas as a management technique and failed to institute other changes
that might help remedy the situation, federal management has continued to do a less than
ideal job of protecting the nation's fishery resources.
8. See id. at i.
9. See id.
10. See id. Additionally, those queried wanted to see the Act address: 1) whether to
rescind the present moratorium on individual quota management programs; 2) how to
implement and finance fishing capacity reduction programs; 3) whether to require or
designate marine protected areas; 4) whether to further specify approaches to address
bycatch and byeatch mortality; and 5) whether to authorize user fees and other charges which
could be used for conservation, management, and enforcement. See id.
11. The Administrative Conference of the United States was an independent advisory
committee created in 1968 to study U.S. administrative processes and recommend
improvements to Congress and federal agencies. From 1968 to 1995, when its funding was
terminated, the ACUS issued approximately 200 recommendations, most of which have been
at least partially implemented. Prior to its termination in 1995, ACUS's recommendations
were published periodically in the Code of Federal Regulations.
12. See 1 C.F.R. § 305.83-4(1993); Seealso WilliamFunk, When Smoke Gets in Your
Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18
ENvm. L. 55, 55 (1987) (suggesting that aside from any benefits claimed by regulatory
20011
190 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 6:187
rulemaking "appears by most accounts to have come of age[,]"' 3 having
been officially endorsed by Congress via the Negotiated Rulemaking Act
of 19904 (NRA). In formally accepting this approach, the NRA established
a framework for negotiated rulemaking conducted by federal agencies.
This framework, which is similar to that originally described for the ACUS,
gives agencies the option of supplementing the notice and comment
procedures required for informal rulemaking, 5 with the use of a negotiated
rulemaking committee. The committee may be formed when the agency
head, with the assistance of a convener 6 if desired, determines that the use
of the committee is in the public interest. 7 The committee constitutes the
heart of the negotiation process and is to consist of no more than twenty-
five members. 8 The members are to represent interests that are likely to
be significantly affected by the proposed rule, 9 and at least one person
representing the agency.20 Such committees, with the administrative
support of agency staff,21 are to consider the matter proposed by the agency
in an attempt to reach consensus 22 concerning the proposed rule.23 A
negotiation, it substitutes bargaining between private interests for a reasoned search for the
public interest); William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DuE L.J. 1351, 1381 (1997)
(stating that negotiated rulemaking and the incentives behind it undermine the principles
underlying traditional administrative law by elevating the importance of consensus among
the parties above the law, facts, and any notion of the public interest); Philip J. Harter,
Negotiating Regulations: A Cure for Malaise, 71 GEo. L.J. 1, 42-112 (1982) (suggesting a
detailed negotiated rulemaking process). Harter's work was originally available as a draft
report for the Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS).
13. Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance of
Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DtuKE L.J. 1255 (1997) (arguing that negotiated rulemaking has
not resulted in reducing the time required for or the amount of litigation arising from
traditional notice and comment rulemaking).
14. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-570 (1990).
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1998).
16. A convener is defined by 5 U.S.C. § 562(3) (1998) as, "a person who impartially
assists an agency in determining whether establishment of a negotiated rulemaking
committee is feasible and appropriate in a particular rulemaking[.j" Id.
17. See 5 U.S.C. § 563(a). This section identifies a number of criterion that the agency
head is to consider in making the determination that the procedure would be in the public
interest, but overall the decision is committed to the discretion of the agency head. See id.
18. See 5 U.S.C. § 565(b). This section does allow the agency head to exceed the 25
member limit where she determines "that a greater number of members is necessary for the
functioning of the committee or to achieve balanced membership." Id.
19. See id. § 564(b).
20. See id. § 565(b).
21. See id. § 565(c).
22. See id. § 562(2). Consensus is defined as "unanimous concurrence among the
interests represented" on the committee unless the committee agrees that it shall mean "a
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committee that reaches a consensus on a proposed rule is required to
transmit a report containing the proposed rule to the head of the agency that
established the committee. A committee that does not reach consensus
may, but is not required to, transmit a similar report to the agency head
indicating any areas where the committee did reach consensus.' Although
agencies are encouraged to engage in negotiated rulemaking via this
process,' there is nothing in the statute indicating that agencies are bound
to accept the consensus of the committee. The underlying hope, at least as
indicated by Congress, is that the process will "increase the acceptability
and improve the substance of rules, making it less likely that the affected
parties will resist enforcement or challenge such rules in court... [and]
also [potentially shorten] the amount of time needed to issue final rules."26
Professor William Funk has provided one of the most insightful
critiques of the negotiated rulemaking process, concluding that the theory
and principles underlying regulatory negotiation were inconsistent with the
theory and principles underlying the Administrative Procedures Act27
(APA), and resulted in the subversion of the public interest." Specifically,
he contends that implicit in the APA is the notion of the rule of law, where
agencies are to carry out the specific or general statutory directions
provided by the legislature which serve to legitimize and justify the very
existence of the agency.29 To the contrary, parties to negotiation are not
serving the law where the outcome is legitimized by the service to the law,
rather the resulting regulation is legitimized by the agreement of the parties
to the negotiation." As a result, he claims that "law becomes nothing more
general but not unanimous concurrence; or agrees upon another specified definition[.]" Id.
23. See id § 566(a).
24. See id. § 566(0. A "committee shall terminate upon promulgation of the-final rule
under consideration, unless the committee's charter contains an earlier termination date or
the agency, after consulting with the committee, or the committee itself specifies an earlier
termination date." See id. § 567.
25. See id § 569(a).
26. See id. § 561 (Congressional Findings (5)), Pub. L. No. 101-648, § 2.
27. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559,701-706 (1998).
28. See William Funk, Bargaining Toward the New Millennium: Regulatory
Negotiation and the Subversion of the Public Interest, 46 DuKE L. J. 1351, 1374-1375
(1997).
29. See id. at 1374.
30. See id. at 1375. As Funk noted, supporters of negotiated rulemaking would not
likely encourage or even support negotiations that bargained for outcomes beyond the scope
of statutory authority, but theory and practice confirms a subtle dynamic in the process "that
diminishes the sanctity of the law as both the source of agency law and its limit." This
concern would seem particularly applicable where legislation is more general and issues are
more complex, often involving tradeoffs among factors listed by congress for the agency to
consider in promulgating regulations. Statutes such as the MSFCMA would fit this
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than the expression of private interests mediated through some governmen-
tal body [where public choice theory becomes the norm]."'"
Secondly, Funk discusses the agency's role as a responsible actor rath-
er than a mediator as a central aspect of the APA.32 Under the APA, the
agency is the authority empowered to implement the statutory scheme and
the entity ultimately responsible for it. The Second Circuit has stated that
the agency's "role does not permit it to act as an umpire blindly calling
balls and strikes for adversaries appearing before it; the right of the public
must receive active and affirmative protection., 33 However, in negotiated
rulemaking the agency is reduced to a mere participant where it is denied
responsibility beyond effectuating the consensus among group members. 4
Furthermore, such agency involvement is not a result of its being viewed
as responsible for the rulemaking, but because "the agency is indisputably
a party in interest and.., would be eligible for participation in negotia-
tions. 35 In effect, this means that the agency "should bargain and trade its
interests (the public interest) in the same way that the other participants
may trade their interests., 36 Thus, rather than being involved in negotia-
tions to ensure that the public interest is paramount and that all other
participants appreciate this role for the agency, in actuality, it is no
different from any other participant and can exert no more influence over
the eventual outcome.
Funk also points out that negotiated rulemaking conflicts with the
APA's requirement,37 and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
require-ment, 38 that agencies engage in reasoned decisionmaking. 39 In
description. See id.
31. Id.
32. See Funk, supra note 29, at 1376; see also 5 U.S.C. §551(1) (A)-(D) (1998)
(defining agency in part as the "authority of the Government").
33. Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608,
620 (2d Cir. 1965).
34. See Funk, supra note 28, at 1376. Although this is not entirely correct where
agencies are not bound to accept the consensus (majority agreement in the case of the
MSFCMA) one could argue the reality is that agencies more often than not accept these
determinations. However, Funk was largely addressing Harter's argument that courts
reviewing regulations should defer to the parties' agreement. See also Harter, supra note 12,
at 102-104.
35. Harter, supra note 12, at 57.
36. See Funk, supra note 28, at 1377.
37. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 556, 557 (requiring rules to be supported by reliable, probative,
and substantial evidence and for there to be findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
statements of reasons therefore).
38. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402,416 (1971) (the
arbitrary and capricious standard of review for agency decisions requires that courts look at
whether the agency's decision was based on the relevant factors and whether there was a
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regulatory negotiation, this plays a much less important role because "the
facts don't matter as long as everyone is happy." Under this theory, an
agency need not support its decision with any findings or reasoned analysis,
in fact the agency need not even show that a problem existed, much less the
feasibility of the proposed solution.4'
Finally, what appears to be at the heart of his argument and underlying
all of his other criticisms is that negotiated rulemaking prevents the agency
from searching for what is truly in the public interest. 2 Underlying the
APA and all other statutes delegating to agencies the authority to promul-
gate regulations is the notion that the agency will act in the best interest of
the public as a whole, that is, the public interest. As he points out, the
public interest may not always be clearly defined, if at all defined by the
authorizing legislation. Regardless of whether it is precisely defined by the
statute or left largely to agency discretion, Congress presumes that the
agency will exercise its discretion and judgment to further the public
interest.4 3 However, under a negotiated paradigm the goal is to achieve
consensus among substantially affected parties who are likely to challenge
the regulation, not promote any notion of the public interest. While it is
true that other forms of modem rulemaking, such as notice and comment
under the APA44 and the National Environmental Policy Act's notice and
comment procedure for environmental impact statements,45 encourage
enhanced participation by affected interests, they do not "[substitute the
participation requirements] for the agency's responsibility to engage in
reasoned decisionmaking in search of the public interest."'
clear error ofjudgment- reasoned decision).
39. See Funk, supra note 28, at 1379-1380.
40. Id at 1381. Also, recall that the underlying theory is that the legitimacy of such
regulations is derived from the consensus among the parties and not its conformity with the
rule of law.
41. Realistically, this would appear to be of little concern in most areas, especially in
fisheries management. The likelihood of all interests reaching consensus on a proposed
regulation of any consequence with so little factual or analytical support is about as close to
zero as one could possibly imagine.
42. See Funk, supra note 29, at 1382-1387. He defines the public interest as that
which is in "the best interests of the nation, the people, the body politic."' d at 1383.
43. See generally Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the
Bureaucratic State, 105 Htv. L. REv. 1511, 1514 (1992) (describing civic republicanism
as the view that government decisions should be the "product of deliberation that respects
and reflects the values of all members of society").
44. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
45. See 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1(a)(4) (1998).
46. Funk, supra note 29, at 1385.
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Other commentators have examined negotiated rulemaking to see how
well the process accomplishes its stated objectives of increasing the
acceptability of rules, improving their substance, reducing likelihood that
affected parties will resist rules or challenge them in court, and decreasing
the amount of time required for promulgation. In particular, Professor Cary
Coglianese performed "an empirical assessment of the impact of negotiated
rulemaking on two of its principal goals: reducing overall rulemaking time
and decreasing the number of judicial challenges to agency rules." He
assembled and analyzed a dataset of "all negotiated rulemakings across all
federal agencies ' in order to assess how well negotiated rulemaking had
achieved these goals. He concluded, to the surprise of many, that the
process did not appear to be more capable of limiting the time required to
promulgate regulations nor did the process avoid subsequent litigation of
rules more than the regular notice and comment procedures required by the
APA.48 In fact, his results indicated that the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), which utilized the procedure the most, had not realized any
decrease in the time required for promulgation compared to its notice and
comment rules, and had actually seen a higher rate of litigation of
negotiated rules than other significant rules promulgated via notice and
comment alone.49 In explanation of his findings, Professor Coglianese
proposes that they may be due to the fact that for the negotiation process to
be successful agencies must both secure and maintain consensus among
parties involved which often proves very difficult.5" Furthermore, the
problem of consensus is additionally complicated by the multiple avenues
of input and oversight in the regulatory process which increase the
likelihood of changes in policy that alter the previous agreements or
negotiations.5
IV. FEDERAL FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
Under the current regime for federal fisheries management, the
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act52 (MSF-
CMA) establishes eight Regional Fishery Management Councils 53
47. See Coglianese, supra note 13, at 1273.
48. See id. at 1335.
49. See id. He notes that these results are particularly surprising given "that agencies
have deliberately selected rules for formal negotiation in order to ensure the procedure's
success." Id.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (1994).
53. See id. § 1852(a).
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(Councils). The Councils are quite similar to negotiated rulemaking com-
mittees in terms of their membership, and their considerable responsibility
in the rulemaking process. Although Council decisions are subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Commerce' (Secretary), the MSFCMA
delegates to each Council the authority to submit to the Secretary a fishery
management plan for its region and any necessary amendments to such plan
upon which federal regulations will be based.5 In addition to outlining
with some detail the required and discretionary contents of fishery
management plans, 6 the MSFCMA authorizes the Councils to propose
regulations it "deems necessary or appropriate for the purposes of
implementing a fishery management plan or plan amendment.., and
making modifications to regulations implementing a fishery management
plan or plan amendment[.]" '5 Although they are subject to the approval of
the Secretary,5" it is fair to say that fishery management plans, as developed
by the Councils, represent the foundation upon which federal management
is based. This system has resulted in the decentralization of the U.S.
fisheries policy allowing great discretion to the regional councils. 9
More importantly for the purposes of this Comment, the MSFCMA
specifies in some detail the required membership for voting Council
members.' Although the number of voting members on each Council
varies considerably," each must contain:
54. See id. § 1854(a).
55. See id. § 1852(h). Additionally this section grants Councils the authority to:
prepare comments on any application for foreign fishing or plan amendment submitted to
it; conduct public hearings, submit periodic reports to the secretary; review and revise
assessments required in formulating the plans; and conduct other activities which are
"necessary and appropriate" to carrying out a foregoing function. See id
56. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a) (containing an extensive laundrylist ofrequired provisions
for fishery management plans prepared by any Council); 1853(b) containing a somewhat
shorter list of provisions that may be included pursuant to the Council's discretion).
57. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(c) (Supp. IV 1998).
58. See 16 U.S.C. § 1854(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
59. See Hsu & Wilen, supra note 4, at 802.
60. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b). Section 1852(c) specifies the non voting members of the
Councils which include: the regional or area director of the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service for the area concerned; the Commander of the Coast Guard district for the area
concerned; the executive director of the Marine Fisheries Commission for the area
concerned; and one representative from the Department of State designated by the Secretary
of State, or any designee of one of the above (the Pacific Council has one additional non
voting member appointed by the Governor of Alaska). See id.§ 1852(c).
61. See id. § 1852(a). The sizes of the Councils vary from seven voting members on
the Caribbean Council to 21 voting members on the Mid-Atlantic Council.
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the principal state official with marine fishery management
responsibility and expertise in each constituent state[,] ... the
regional director of the National Marine Fisheries Service for the
geographic area concerned, or his designee . . . [individuals
appointed by the Secretary] who, by reason of their occupational
or other experience, scientific expertise, or training, are knowl-
edgeable regarding the conservation and management, or the
commercial or recreational harvest, of the fishery resources of the
geographical area concerned.62
The state and federal administrative officials are clearly specified, their
membership on the Councils does not require the Secretary's independent
approval and in theory they represent more of an objective interest than
those members appointed to the Councils by the Secretary.
Of particular interest to this Comment are those voting members
appointed to the Council by the Secretary. The MSFCMA further specifies
that,
[t]he Secretary shall appoint the [remaining] members of each
Council from a list of individuals submitted by the Governor of
each applicable constituent state. A Governor may not submit the
names of individuals to the Secretary for appointment unless the
Governor has determined that each such individual is qualified
under the requirements [of the previous paragraph] and unless the
Governor has to the extent practicable, first consulted with
representatives of the commercial and recreational fishing interests
of the state regarding those interests.63
Also, "[t]he Secretary, in making appointments under this section, shall, to
the extent practicable, ensure a fair and balanced apportionment, on a
rotating or other basis, of the active participants (or their representatives)
in the commercial and recreational fisheries under the jurisdiction of the
Council."' Pursuant to this directive, the Secretary must file annual
reports with Congress regarding "actions taken by the Secretary to ensure
that such fair and balanced apportionment is achieved. ''65 Thus, it is
apparent that the MSFCMA goes to considerable lengths to ensure
62. Id. § 1852(b). Also, this subsection specifies that the Secretary "shall, by
regulation, prescribe criteria for determining whether an individual satisfies the requirements
of the subparagraph." id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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traditional fishing interests are well represented on the Councils. In effect,
this places a great deal of influence on the regulatory process in the hands
of those groups sought to be regulated under the MSFCMA, specifically
recreational and commercial fishing interests.'
V. ANALYSIS
The similarities between the processes established by the NRA, and
the MSFCMA are obvious. Under both statutes, a body of individuals is
given the primary responsibility for preparing proposed rules subject to the
approval of an agency head who is at least to some extent subject to
political oversight.67 Both bodies, the committee under the NRA and the
Council under the MSFCMA, are composed largely of representatives of
regulated interests, with some representatives from the agency itself."
While there are also obvious differences between the processes established
by the NRA and the MSFCMA, such as the fact that the NRA seeks
consensus among interested parties where the MSFCMA does not do soper
se,69 both are based on bargaining between interested parties. Given that
66. While a reading of the statute indicates that the Secretary is not bound to appoint
only representatives of fishing interests, section 1852(b) also includes those knowledgeable
regarding conservation and management, as we will see in the case of the Gulf Council, that
is often the way it turns out.
67. With the occasional exception of independent agencies which may utilize
negotiated rulemaking, the agency head is typically appointed by the President of the United
States, and thus is to some extent subject to the oversight of a politically accountable office.
Also, the agency is subject to the oversight of Congress via the budgetary process. See
generally Daniel Cohen & Peter L. Strauss, Congressional Review ofAgency Regulations,
49 ADEMN. L. REv. 95 (1997) (addressing legislative oversight as a means to limit agency
discretion); Peter L. Strauss, The Place ofAgencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 Coum. L REv. 573 (1984) (addressing the role of legislative and
executive oversight even with regard to independent commissions); Pai Verkuil, Jawboning
Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 CoLum. L. REv. 943
(1980) (stating that agencies' work is centrally managed by executive).
68. Although the regional councils are composed of proportionally fewer representa-
tives of regulated interests than Harter likely intended for negotiated rulemaking commi-
ttees, they are much like the framework created by the NRA. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 565(b), 566(b)
(1998) (specifying that there is to be at least one representative of the agency on a commi-
ttee, and that such representative(s) are to participate with the same rights and responsibili-
ties as other committees). While the MSFCMA specifies that a greater number of agency
representatives must be voting members on the Council, the members represent both state
and federal regulatory interests, and the difference of one extra specified member seems
inconsequential. See 16 U.S.C. § 1852(b).
69. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 1852(e)(1), Council actions are approved by majority
vote of those present and voting, but depending on the Council and the numerical strength
of affected interests, it may be possible for an interest to prevent Council approval of
2001]
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the similarities lie at the core of the problem, many of the criticisms of
negotiated rulemaking are equally applicable to the quasi-negotiated
approach taken by the MSFCMA.
As this Comment will indicate, both processes result in regulations that
promote regulated interests over any notion of the public interest. It is
important to note once again that for the purposes of this Comment the term
public interest shall be equated with that which promotes the long term
health and stability of the resource, or "resource minded management."
This definition conforms to the concept of the public interest as used by
Funk, in that the long term health of fishery resources is certainly in the
"best interest of the nation, the people, the body politic." 70
Due to differences between the Council system and the negotiated
rulemaking structure established by the NRA, Funk's criticisms overstate
some of the problems as they relate to allowing affected interests having
voting representation on the regional councils. However, just because they
are potentially less problematic does not mean that the issues are not still
of concern. As a result of these differences, it would be useful to first lay
out the current membership of a Council and use it to consider the potential
applicability of Funk's criticisms of negotiated rulemaking. The Gulf of
Mexico Fishery Management Council, for example, is composed of seven-
teen voting members, of which only six represent related interests of
admin-istrative government. Further diluting the interests of agencies is the
fact that each of the six representatives actually represents the interests of
a different agency, one from each member state's agency7' and one from
the National Marine Fisheries Service. The remaining eleven members of
the Gulf Council are those appointed by the Secretary pursuant to section
1852(b)(2), six of whom represent recreational fishing interests with the
remaining five representing commercial fishing interests. 72 Thus, recre
proposed rules. As previously noted, 5 U.S.C. § 562(2) allows a negotiated rule-making
committee to define consensus as a simple majority, making them even more analogous to
the regional councils.
70. See Funk, supra note 28, at 1283.
71. The state agencies represented on the Gulf of Mexico Council are the Florida Fish
and Wildlife Conservation Commission, Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural
Resources, Mississippi Department of Marine Resources, Louisiana Department of Wildlife
and Fisheries, and Texas Parks and Wildlife Department. Although ideally each state agency
should represent some notion of the public interest (pursuing resource use that protects
resources for future generations) each represents more of a state public interest. More than
likely, each state has a slightly different agenda given that each faces potentially different
issues, for example a state with predominantly recreational interests would face different
pressures and issues than a state with predominantly commercial interests.
72. See How to Contact the Gulf ofMexico Fishery Management Council (visited Nov.
5, 1999) <http://www.gulfcouncil.org/contact.html> (listing the names, addresses, etc., of
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ational interests alone have a voting power equal to that of all the state and
federal regulatory interests combined, and when added to commercial
representation, user groups have almost a two to one voting advantage over
those intended to protect the public interest.
The notion that the rule of law is subverted through the final outcome
being mainly an expression of mediated private interests rather than a
legitimate interpretation of the statutory direction has a valid basis in the
Council system. The MSFCMA provides lengthy direction regarding what
Councils are to include in their fishery management plans (on which
regulations are based), but like many other statutes they are not in the form
of specific instructions. For example, the MSFCMA requires that all plans
"contain the conservation and management measures ...which are
necessary and appropriate for the conservation and management of the
fishery, to prevent overfishing and rebuild overfished stocks, and to protect,
restore, and promote the long term health and stability of the fishery[.]"73
While this section clearly requires a Council to prevent overfishing, protect
and restore stocks, etc., it makes the final determination subject to what is
reasonable and appropriate. This is the classic role for agencies where, as
previously mentioned, agencies are thought to exercise such discretion in
an attempt to further the public interest.74 Thus, in determining exactly
what is necessary and appropriate an agency would try to determine what
outcome would best serve the aggregate interest of the public at large,
there-by effectuating the rule of law intended in the statute. However,
given that it is not just the agency that determines what is necessary and
appropriate, but a combination of it and those interests represented by the
Council as a whole, the final outcome is less likely to be an interpretation
that reflects a consistent and public spirited notion of the rule of law. It is
more likely to result in what best serves the aggregate interest of those
special interests with voting membership on the Council. Consequently,
the statutory direction is not defined in terms of the public interest, and the
rule of law is subject to the changing interpretations of special interests
represented on the Council.
Related to this notion is the concept of the public interest being
subverted through agencies bargaining with, rather than searching for, the
Council members and the sector that they represent). Although it may be debatable whether
the appointed individuals actually represent the interests they were appointed to represent,
presumably the Secretary who appointed them and the Governor who recommended them
felt that they would act as such. For purposes here it is necessary that this author assumes
these members represent those interests they were appointed to represent.
73. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
74. See generally Seidenfeld, supra note 43, at 1514.
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public interest that the authorizing legislation arguably intends.75 Given
that affected interests have greater representation on the Council, the
agency is forced to bargain with the public interest in order to achieve some
meaningful regulation. Either the agency goes in with a notion of what
should be done and bargains down to some acceptable level below what is
truly in the public interest, or it comes in taking a position that is well
above that which they have objectively ascertained to be in the public
interest, and bargains down to some position approximating the public
interest. Regardless, given that the agency's membership is a minority one
in comparison to the combined strength of other represented interests, it has
less bargaining power and will almost certainly have to give in to positions
that favor special interests. As a result, the public interest will be bargained
in a similar manner as any special interest represented on the Council.
The concern that the agency's duty to engage in reasoned decision-
making is undermined by the regulatory negotiation process76 is also valid
within the Council system. Given the difficulty in accurately assessing the
status of, and potential impacts to, vast fishery resources, there is little
scientists can do to assure others that such findings are accurate. Repre-
sented interests may contest the findings reported by the agency representa-
tives, supporting their own determinations with reported personal experi-
ences. Consequently, such interests may endorse less restrictive alterna-
tives. As a result of this complexity and uncertainty, it is difficult to
determine whether a decision was reasoned beyond ensuring that all
relevant considerations were raised (not necessarily sufficiently addressed)
in the deliberations, and the court's review may be limited as such.
As all the previous criticisms help illustrate, the eventual outcome is
that the Councils are prevented from searching for that which is truly in the
public interest. Through special interest participation in the process,
Councils may be forced to exercise their discretion to promote special
interests. With the agency serving as a mediator of sorts among the voting
interests and only as a minority voter, the outcome is more likely to
represent a dominant interest or a coalition of represented interests than that
of an overall public interest. As Judge Posner wrote of negotiated rule-
making, "[i]t sounds like the abdication of regulatory authority to the
regulated, the full burgeoning of the interest-group state, and the final
confirmation of the 'capture' theory of administrative regulation."'
75. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410-420
(1971).
76. See Funk, supra note 28; Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power
Comm'n, 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965); see also 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1) (A)-(D) (1998).
77. USA Group Loan Services, Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 T.1 (7"' Cir. 1996).
200
Federal Regional Fishery Management Councils
Coglianese's findings and hypotheses regarding the success of the
negotiated rulemaking approach in achieving the stated objectives 78 appear
equally applicable to the Regional Council system. Given the previously
noted tendency of most fishermen to oppose any and all regulations aimed
at limiting their activities, it would seem difficult to imagine their reaching
anything resembling a consensus with agency staff, and even more difficult
to imagine with members representing a truly adverse interest. Although
the MSFCMA does not require Councils to reach a consensus to approve
proposed rules, agency staff are not ordinarily strong enough in numbers
to get proposals approved, 79 thus they must always get the support of at
least some of the representatives of the affected interests. Even more
relevant are the multiple opportunities for input and oversight after
agreement, i.e., all Council actions are subject to review by the Secretary,
which realistically equates to a high level of input from the agency as a
whole.
VI. CONCLUSION
Substantially affected interests should have their voting membership on
the Councils greatly reduced if not eliminated entirely, and in attempt to
mitigate for lost representation, such interests should also have their non-
voting membership increased. Fisheries management is a difficult process
that should be based largely on science and technology determining what
must be done to promote the long term health and viability of the nation's
fishery resources. This would be more efficiently accomplished by experi-
enced, technically competent and objective personnel that are more insulat-
ed from the desires of special interests who seek to exploit the resource.
Admittedly, affected persons are useful in helping to make allocation
decisions, and their participation as nonvoting members would still allow
them to contribute to such decisions without providing them the opportu-
nity to determine quotas and other decisions that are more science or
technology based. The management process sometimes requires that
difficult decisions be made, and in order to make the best decisions under
78. Coglianese suggested that the apparent failure of the negotiated rlemaking process
to reduce both the time to promulgate rules and the number of legal challenges brought
against agency proposals was due to difficulty in obtaining consensus and the numerous
avenues for changing proposals after consensus is achieved. See Conglianese, supra note
13, at 1321-30.
79. It is certainly possible that a quorum could exist where all agency representatives
were attending and enough other representatives were absent that the agency people could
have sufficient numbers on their own to constitute a majority of those present. However,
this is undoubtedly a highly unlikely scenario.
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complicated and politically tense circumstances, decision makers need to
be as objective as possible. Although some may argue that agencies are
not as objective as they are given credit for being, it is difficult to imagine
an agency being less objective than a group of regulated persons who
represent only a portion of the population, many of whom make their living
through the exploitation of a resource that they are entrusted with
regulating. It seems to be a shirking of regulatory responsibility to allow
regulated interests to have such significant input, if not effective control of
the regulatory process.
While it is apparent that resource users should have some input into the
regulatory process to ensure that it accounts for their well being and that
regulations effectively regulate their activity, it should not be at such a high
level. Special interests should still retain some representation on the
Councils to champion their views, and may still avail themselves of the
traditional informal means of special interest influence with which they
have been so successful historically. In fisheries management, all regula-
tions are subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce, who is
appointed by the President, and is to some extent politically accountable 0
for agency actions. In fact, some might argue that the influence of
presidential political oversight extends much further down the chain of
command. Further, Congress, whose members are certainly politically
accountable, has a great deal of influence over the agency via the budgetary
process and more informal oversight. These multiple avenues of oversight
help ensure some level of significant accountability that is sufficient to
protect the legitimate interests of affected persons without forcing the
agency to engage in bargaining with the best interests of the public in
exchange for concessions from special interests with a strangle hold on the
regulatory process.
Finally, if one assumes that Coglianese's findings are accurate and
equally applicable to the regional councils, that is, that rules promulgated
by the Councils do not save time or result in fewer challenges than they
would if affected interests were not allowed voting membership, there
would appear to be no benefit to utilizing the current structure. Given the
realities of more modem issue networks"' and interest in fisheries manage
80. Politically accountable refers to accountability to the public at large, or at least the
electorate, so that if decisions made by the individual are unpopular they must answer to the
voters or in this case to another individual who must in turn answer to the voters. Further,
most would agree that such appointed agency heads are politically accountable to a great
extent due to the nature of their relationship with the President and Congress.
81. The term issue network refers to the concept that was originally described by Hugh
Heclo. See Hugh Heclo, Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment, in THE Naw
AMRIcAN PoLmcAL SysTM, 87, 103-104 (Anthony King ed., 1978). Central to this notion
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ment, it is more than likely that his findings hold just as true here. Not only
does the inclusion of such members on the Council require more negotia-
tion and inevitably slow the rulemaking process, it is doubtful that their
representation actually reduces the number of regulations challenged in
court. The days of the recreational/commercial dichotomy have changed
and continue to change as more organized interests begin to form and
realize their stake in the well being of the country's fishery resources.8 2
Why should only recreational and commercial users be allowed representa-
tion? Why are divers, swimmers, and preservationists or other environmen-
tally oriented interests not represented per se? Given the diverse interests
that can claim to be substantially affected by regulating marine fishery
resources, it would be hard to imagine that there was not an interest group
in the United States ready and willing to challenge a regulation promul-
gated by a Council. However, it would be very difficult to include all such
interests. It is unlikely that trying to include all potentially affected
interests on the Councils in an attempt to reduce the number of challenges
from excluded interests would succeed. While such an effort might result
in negotiated rules that more accurately reflected what was in the public
interest it would not likely result in fewer challenges from user groups and
is the observation that participation in public policy making within the United States is not
limited to the traditional concept of iron triangles composed of executive agencies,
congressional committees, and interest groups with a stake in the regulation. Instead of iron
triangles solidified around specific policy areas, issue networks, defined as shared
knowledge groups having to do with some aspect of public policy, are composed of members
with potentially more diverse interests that fade in and out of specific issue areas pursuant
to changes in interests, agendas, and other ties to a specific issue. In this context it refers to
the involvement of conservation, marine mammal protection, or other environmental groups
in fisheries management issues when the management issues at hand also concern or touch
on an issue related to the group and its membership. Comparatively, an iron triangle would
only include interests that represented user groups such as recreational or commercial
fishermen and this would remain constant with all management issues being addressed.
82. It is still a reality that the majority of lawsuits brought against the National Marine
Fisheries Service are from user groups or organizations that represent the interests of user
groups. However, there is evidence that this fact is changing as a variety of organizations
that do not represent consumptive user group interests are increasingly involved in
challenges to federal fisheries regulatory decisions. Groups such as Greenpeace, Sierra
Club, Massachusetts Audubon Society, and others have become more active in this regard.
See Greenpeace v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 55 F. Supp. 2d. 1248 (W.D. Wash.
1999); Earth Island Institute v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d. 1064 (CIT 1999); Massachusetts
Audubon Soc., Inc. v. Daley, 31 F. Supp. 2d. (D. Mass. 1998); American Rivers v. National
Marine Fisheries Service, No. 94-940-MA, 1995 WL 464544 (D. Or. 1995). These suits
involve a variety of groups allied only temporarily around an issue, and although the
challenges do not all relate specifically to council decisions, they at least indicate a
willingness on the part of the groups to take action against the agency for management
related decisions.
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would very possibly only increase the difficulty in negotiating rules.
Accepting that very little can be done to reduce the number of challenges,
especially from user groups, the only feasible alternative is to eliminate
interested parties from being represented on the Councils in the hope that
the rules will at least be more scientifically founded, better represent the
public interest, and the process itself will not be unnecessarily bogged
down by contentious negotiations.
